Earlier in August, Reuters (2026) reported that the US was preparing to inform partners that they would eventually have to pick a side in what will be this century’s gambit. Its apparent battlelines were drawn last month, with the formation of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO) in Shanghai, itself a counterweight to Pax Silica, formed in December 2025 in Washington. So far, twenty-five economies have signed Pax Silica, whilst WAICO was inaugurated with twenty-nine founding members.
Yet, to view this emerging schism through a simple, neo-Cold War lens of bipolarity is insufficient and reductive in light of modern multipolarity. For whilst nuclear weapons and ICBMs were ultimately instruments of destruction and deterrence, AI is a far more totalising technological system with disparate possibilities for reshaping production, warfare, communication, governance and everyday life. The gambit, then, is not simply over who controls AI, but what technological power will mean in this new world.
Pax Silica – Peace Through Strength
The US is operating with a logic of ‘peace through strength’. Security is achieved by controlling, or securing, the material foundations upon which technological power depends. Reducing ‘coercive dependencies’ on semiconductors, critical minerals, energy manufacturing and digital infrastructure is key for the US, which has been privy to the delicate chokepoints characterising globalised supply chains (Rafsanjani, 2026; US State Department, 2026).
Developing a consistent and secure supply of semiconductors is particularly paramount for the US, who currently source its semiconductors from an eclectic, transnational supply chain. UK-based Arm provides foundational chip architecture, Dutch ASML supplies critical lithography equipment, Taiwan’s TSMC manufactures many of the world’s most advanced chips, whilst South Korean firms dominate key memory technologies. Without a secure semiconductor ecosystem, the US would struggle to project power and influence in the multipolar world and, crucially, to continue developing toward artificial superintelligence.
It is estimated that 54 cents of every dollar spent on data centre infrastructure goes toward semiconductors (Brown et al. 2026). As technology develops and demand for AI increases, so too do chips, with global sales across the second quarter of this year exceeding $400b alone – a 35.1% increase from the first (SIA, 2026). It is clear, as Miller (p.16, 2022), outlined in Chip War, that the semiconductor is for the 21st century what oil was for the 20th. US Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg has voiced the same opinion (US State Department, 2026).
Meanwhile, the inclusion of various South American countries to Pax Silica, including Panama, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Argentina, bears the mark of the ‘Donroe Doctrine’, assuring that US interests in the Western hemisphere remain secure. As for AI model development, the US has propelled technology companies – including Nvidia, Microsoft, Meta, Open AI and Apple, among others – to a status resembling technological fiefdoms, further complicating the traditional distinction between corporate and state power.
This state-private dichotomy reflects an increasingly selective, post-liberal approach to economic and technological security. Where the previous liberal paradigm sought stability through openness and universalised interdependence, Washington is now seeking security through selective interdependence between trusted partners. It is a state of play which increasingly reflects the uncertainty at play in the multipolar world.
WAICO: Peace Through Development
China, meanwhile, is pursuing a different route to technological power. Whereas Washington is attempting to secure the material foundations of AI, Beijing aims to shape the political and normative environment in which those technologies develop.
At WAICO’s inauguration Xi Jinping spoke of a ‘people-centric’ approach to AI development stressing ethics, transparency, accessibility, multilateralism and equality (CPPCC, 2026; MFA, 2026). This included adherence to the UN Charter, with Secretary-General Antonio Guterres delivering a speech at the inauguration (MINDD, 2026).
Beijing has attempted to give these principles material form. This is most obvious with its open-source AI models like DeepSeek and Qwen, which they claim have been downloaded over ten billion times (CPPCC, 2026). China has also previously set up several forums including the Global AI Governance Initiative, the AI Capacity-Building Action Plan for Good and for All and the AI+ International Cooperation Initiative (Science & Technology Daily, 2026).
However, these initiatives are not purely altruistic. China clearly recognises the growing gap between the Great Powers in their great gambit and those less considered in the multipolar world. This has made WAICO particularly attractive among Global South states. China plans to develop five-thousand opportunities in AI training over the next five years, form cooperation centres with Global South intergovernmental organisations, and provide thirty states with MAZU, an AI-powered meteorological warning system (CPPCC, 2026).
These initiatives will inevitably yield material benefits, but their strategic value extends beyond them. WAICO creates technological relationships with states traditionally heavily dependent upon existing Western infrastructure. These relationships also give Beijing a vehicle to shape norms, standards and institutions governing AI, therefore influencing what legitimate technological development looks like in this emerging, critical paradigm.
There is a distinctly constructivist feel to this approach whereby power derives not just from controlling technological capabilities, but from shaping the norms through which those capabilities are understood and legitimised. Eisenhower’s 1953 Atoms for Peace speech helped establish a language through which peaceful nuclear development could be imagined. Perhaps Xi hopes to do something similar with AI, albeit through a more explicitly pluralistic framework.
Multipolar Complexity
As outlined by Rafsanjani (2026), the success of Pax Silica and WAICO will depend on their ability to provide physical infrastructure, assert global standards, and project a convincing narrative around AI. Even if Washington appears intent on making partners choose a side, reducing today’s technological order to yesterday's bipolarity risks overlooking the complexity of the system emerging beneath.
A Cold War narrative only goes so far. Its defining divisions were legible: two ideological blocs, organised around rival political and military systems. The emerging paradigm of AI is considerably messier. Its geography is disparate, its actors are both private and public, and its technologies depend upon supply chains that cross political boundaries.
Kazakhstan, for instance, is the current sole signatory to both Pax Silica and WAICO, demonstrating the disparity between technological alignment and broader geopolitical allegiance. India is another contradiction: despite being a founding member of BRICS and holding its presidency, it has aligned itself with Pax Silica. Then there is the EU, which is entangled in regulatory and technological interests whilst retaining its relationships with both sides. Diplomatic non-alignment may remain possible; technological non-alignment is considerably more difficult, as AI depends upon chips, cloud infrastructure, capital, data and standards which cross national borders.
The test, then, will not be what Washington or Beijing want, but how the rest of the globe navigates between them. AI may produce neither a new Cold War nor the end of globalisation, but something a bit more complex: a Globalisation 2.0. Interconnection will remain, perhaps even intensify, but through increasingly transnational networks of states, corporations, capital, infrastructure and technology. The gambit of this century may therefore not be about choosing between two technological orders, but about whether a multipolar world can accommodate them both.
REFERENCES:
- Brown, E., Gary, M., Koren, K. and Luck, P. (2026) The Impact of Tariffs on the AI Data Center Buildout: Balancing Supply Chain Security and AI Infrastructure Leadership. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 May. Available at: (Accessed: 7 September 2026).
- Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (2026) ‘Xi calls for equitable global AI governance, unveils new cooperation body’, 20 July. Available at: http://en.cppcc.gov.cn/2026-07/20/c_1198497.htm (Accessed: 3 September 2026).
- Miller, C. (2022) Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology. New York: Scribner.
- MINDD (2026) ‘Agreement on the Establishment of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization’, MINDD – Defenda Seus Direitos, 27 July. Available at: https://vitimasfalsoscondominios.blogspot.com/2026/07/agreement-on-establishment-of-world.html (Accessed: 3 September 2026).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2026) ‘Signing Ceremony of the Agreement on the Establishment of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization Held in Shanghai’, 16 July. Available at: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202607/t20260717_11984747.html (Accessed: 3 September 2026).
- Rafsanjani, A.A. (2026) ‘Pax Silica and WAICO: The Struggle for Global AI Narrative Between US and China’, The Diplomatic Insight, 29 August. Available at: https://thediplomaticinsight.com/pax-silica-waico-global-ai-narrative-us-china/ (Accessed: 3 September 2026).
- Reuters (2026) ‘EXCLUSIVE: US to tell partners they must pick sides in AI race with China’, Reuters, 14 August. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-tell-partners-they-must-pick-sides-ai-race-with-china-2026-08-14/ (Accessed: 3 September 2026).
- Science and Technology Daily (2026) ‘WAICO: A Milestone for Global AI Governance’, 19 July. Available at: https://www.stdaily.com/web/English/2026-07/19/content_549692.html (Accessed: 3 September 2026).
- Semiconductor Industry Association (2026) ‘Global Semiconductor Sales Increase 35.1% from Q1 2026 to Q2 2026’, 6 August. Available at: https://www.semiconductors.org/global-semiconductor-sales-increase-35-1-from-q1-2026-to-q2-2026/ (Accessed: 3 September 2026).
- U.S. Department of State (2026) ‘Pax Silica’. Available at: U.S. Department of State – Pax Silica (Accessed: 3 September 2026).
Add comment
Comments